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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLOTTE HEALEY 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
DFG, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Civil No. 87-0237 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1987). 
STATEMENT QF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court properly conclude that Ms. 
Charlotte Healey (hereinafter referred to as "Healey1*) was an 
employee-at-will and could be discharged for any or no reason 
whatsoever? 
2. Did the trial court properly rule that Healey1s 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress was 
legally and factually unsupportable? 
3. Did the court correctly rule that damages for 
injury to reputation were inappropriate? 
4. Was the court correct in finding that punitive 
damages were not recoverable? 
RELEVANT STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated/ § 35-4-2. Public Policy -
General Welfare Requires Creation of Unemployment Reserves -
Employment Offices. (Reproduced in full in the Addendum as 
Exhibit D). 
Utah Code Annotated, § 35-4-11. Administration of 
Employment Security Act. (Reproduced in full in the Addendum 
as Exhibit E). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered in 
favor of the Respondent/ D.F.G./ Inc./ (hereinafter "D.F.G."), 
by the Second District Court in Davis County. 
Course of the Proceedings Below 
Appellant/ Healey filed suit against her former 
employer/ D.F.G./ in Second District Court in Davis County in 
October/ 1985. Following completion of discovery, D.F.G. filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment. Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
granted D.F.G.vs motion dismissing all of Healey's claims on 
August 7/ 1987. Healey appeals from that judgment. 
Statement of Undisputed Facts 
Healey was hired by D.F.G., a manufacturer of ski 
goggles and other related equipment/ in May of 1977 as a 
production line worker. (Deposition of Healey, hereinafter 
"Healey Dep.", Vol 1, p. 3-5). When she was hired/ Healey 
received a three page handout of company policies regarding 
sick leave, vacations, and holidays. (Hereinafter referred to 
as the "handout"). (Healey Dep.# Vol. 2, p. 83). However, she 
offered no evidence that she entered into any type of written 
employment contract with D.F.G., or that she was told that she 
had a permanent job that would last for a specific period of 
time. 
Healey was promoted to a supervisory position in the 
lens room in August of 1977, and held that position until she 
was discharged in February of 1985. (Healey Dep., Vol. 1, 
p. 6). In conjunction with this new position, Healey was paid 
an hourly wage instead of the piece-rate wage she had been 
receiving on the production line. However, she still did not 
enter into any type of employment contract with D.F.G., nor 
were verbal assurances made as to a specified period of 
employment. (Healey Dep., Vol. 1, p. 5-6; Vol. 2, p. 83-84; 
Deposition of Reed Leavitt, hereinafter "Leavitt Dep.", p. 
27-28). 
In 1981/ Healey began reporting to Maria Gray 
(hereinafter "Gray") who was, and is, production manager for 
D.F.G. By all accounts, including her own, Ms. Healey resented 
Gray's promotion and had a difficult time interacting with 
Gray. (Healey Dep., Vol. 1, p. 13-34; Deposition of E. William 
Scott, hereinafter "Scott Dep.", p. 14; Leavitt Dep., 
hereinafter "Leavitt Dep.", p. 29). Personality conflicts 
developed and the relationship became hostile and 
counter-productive. (Scott Dep., p. 14). On numerous 
occasions, Healey was insubordinate to Gray, refusing and 
failing to carry out her orders and instructions. (Healey 
Dep., Vol 2, p. 36-37, and 108-109; Scott Dep., p. 13-14; 
Deposition of Gray, hereinafter "Gray Dep.," p. 15-16; and 
Leavitt Dep., p. 29). 
Both Gray and Leavitt, the plant manager, repeatedly 
counseled Healey to try to improve her relationship with Gray. 
Healey acknowledged that on at least two occasions she talked 
with Leavitt about the problem and that she talked with Gray 
directly on "numerous occasions." (Healey Dep., Vol. 2, p. 
21-23; Leavitt Dep., p. 29). However, Healey never 
acknowledged that she was responsible for any part of the 
conflict and even denied that Gray was her superior. 
Illustrative of the situation was Healey's statement to Gray, 
-Then I told, I says that, you know, 'I don't work for your 
[sic].' I says, 'I work for D.F.G., 'you know'". (Healey 
Dep., Vol. 2, p. 108-109). 
The extent and depth of the animosity which Healey 
held towards Gray was dramatically illustrated in a letter 
Healey submitted to the Division of Employment Security. 
Although this letter was ostensibly filed to aid an employee 
seeking unemployment compensation, it was actually a personal 
attack on Gray and made no reference to the merits of the 
unemployment claim. The letter stated that Gray; 
1. Makes false accusations. 
2. Is neglenijent [sic] of her responsibilities. 
3 No communication (from person-to-person on lower 
echelon.) 
4. No dignity (self-respect). 
5. In general she lacks the true responsibility of 
manager type of any company, and futhermore [sic] 
Rules in company policy were broken by 
responsible parties. 
(Healey's letter is included in the Addendum as Exhibit A). 
D.F.G. was unconcerned that Healey had submitted a 
letter in support of another employee's unemployment claim, but 
was troubled by what the letter reflected about Healey's 
attitude towards her direct supervisor. (Scott Dep., p. 31). 
Moreover, Gray was greatly upset by the vicious and 
unsubstantiated accusations in the letter. (Gray Dep., p. 15; 
Leavitt Dep., p. 32). Healey's letter reflected the severity 
of the conflict and showed that attempts by Gray and others to 
improve the relationship had failed. (Scott Dep., p. 32; 
Leavitt Dep., p. 32; Gray Dep., p. 15). 
Approximately one month after seeing the letter, Gray 
informed Leavitt and Scott that she was going to resign. (Gray 
Dep., p. 15; Leavitt Dep.# p. 32). At this point, Leavitt and 
Scott, after serious deliberation, made the decision to 
discharge Healey in order to ensure the continued employment of 
Gray, a critical employee due to her position as production 
manager, responsible for all assembly operations. (Scott Dep., 
p. 51-52; Leavitt Dep., p. 33). Discharge was the only 
alternative available, as there were no other jobs available 
where Healey would not have to report to, or communicate with, 
Gray. (Scott Dep., p. 57; Leavitt Dep., p. 28, 32-33). 
Healey was notified of her discharge in private, after 
work had ended on a Friday afternoon. She was told the reason 
for her discharge and paid all back wages, accrued vacation 
earnings, and other benefits to which she was entitled. 
(Healey Dep., Vol. 2, p. 52-54). Subsequently, at Healey's 
request, and as provided for in the handout, Scott, the 
president of D.F.G., reviewed the decision to discharge Ms. 
Healey. He concluded that the action was required so as to 
retain the services of Gray, a more valuable employee. (Scott 
Dep., p. 37-38; Healey Dep., Vol. 2, p. 66). Healey then 
requested that the matter be submitted to an outside arbitrator 
for review. This procedure was also provided for in the 
handout. A written statement was submitted by D.F.G. and 
copied to Healey who was given the opportunity to submit her 
own statement. (Scott Dep., p. 37-38). Healey chose not to 
submit a statement. (Healey Dep., Vol. 2, p. 81). The 
arbitrator, after a careful review of the facts, concluded that 
D.F.G. had a valid business reason for the discharge and that, 
therefore, the discharge was for "good cause." (Scott Dep., p. 
53). 
Healey then filed suit alleging breach of contract, 
wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. (R. 1). After extensive discovery had been 
completed D.F.G. moved for summary judgment. The Honorable 
Douglas Cornaby granted D.F.G1s Motion on July 14, 1987, ruling 
that under Utah case law Healey was an employee-at-will. 
Recognizing the two exceptions to the general 
employment-at-will rule, as set forth in Rose v. Allied 
Development Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986), the trial court 
concluded that Healey failed to produce any evidence to 
establish that she was covered by either of the exceptions 
(R. 82-83). (See Exhibits C and D in the Addendum). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court in Rose v. Allied Development Co,, 719 P.2d 
83 (Utah 1986), reaffirmed that only two exceptions to the 
employment-at-will doctrine are recognized in Utah: 1) If 
employment is for a specified period of time; or 2) If 
additional consideration exists. Construing the pleadings and 
the discovery record in the light most favorable to the 
appellant, there is no evidence that Healey's employment was 
for a specific duration, or that additional consideration 
existed. Additionally, notwithstanding appellant's arguments, 
Utah does not recognize a public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will rule, nor would it be appropriate to 
recognize such an exception under the facts of this case. 
Furthermore, even if Healey could only be discharged for just 
cause, the uncontroverted evidence establishes just cause. 
Appellant's promissory estoppel argument was not 
raised below, thus this Court is precluded from even 
considering that issue. Moreover, Healey has failed to offer 
any evidence to support the elements of that claim. Finally, 
Healey's claim for damages for injury to reputation, for severe 
emotional distress, and for punitive damages are inappropriate 
in this case and were properly dismissed by the trial court. 
The summary judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed in its entirety. 
ARGUMENT 
The standard of review to be applied by an appellate 
court where summary judgment is granted below is well 
established: 
Our inquiry on review is whether there is 
any genuine issue as to any material fact/ 
and if there is not, whether the plaintiffs 
are entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Frederick May & Co., Inc. v. 
Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368, P.2d 266 (1962), 
Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 
11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960). The 
defendant cannot rely upon the mere 
allegations or denials of her pleadings to 
avoid a summary judgment but must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial, Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P. 
Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979). 
Respondent D.F.G. established through uncontroverted 
testimony and evidence the lack of any material issue of fact. 
Further, it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Therefore, the trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
POINT I 
HEALEY WAS AN EMPLOYEE-AT-WILL, AND HER 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP WITH D.F.G. WAS 
TERMINABLE AT THE WILL OF EITHER PARTY. 
The Utah Courts have long recognized the common law 
doctrine of employment-at-will. Under this doctrine, both the 
employer and the employee are free to terminate the employment 
relationship at any time, for any or no reason, absent specific 
contractual language limiting this right. The doctrine was 
applied in Held v. American Linen Supply Co., 307 P.2d 210 
(Utah 1957), where the Utah Supreme Court was required to 
determine whether or not a collective bargaining agreement 
limited the employer's right to terminate its employees. The 
Court found that because the contract did not specifically 
limit the company's authority, except to prohibit termination 
for union activities, "the parties do not intend to limit the 
common law right of the parties to discharge or to leave the 
employment at the will of either." Xd. at 212. 
Later, in Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 
354 P.2d 599, (Utah 1960), a discharged plaintiff brought suit 
against his former employer for breach of contract. While the 
contract stated only that the "company agrees to employ Bullock 
as its general manager", plaintiff argued that he relied on the 
written contract in terminating his previous employment, moving 
his family to Salt Lake City, and sustaining a cut in salary 
and benefits. Id. at 560-61. The trial court granted the 
employer's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff 
appealed. Notwithstanding plaintiff's reliance on the promise 
of employment, this Court affirmed the summary judgment 
concluding that because "the contract did not specify any 
definite period of time for the duration of such employment, 
the implications are that either party could terminate the 
contract at will. . . H. id. at 562. 
This Court continued to subscribe to the employment-
at-will rule in Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979). 
In Bihlmaier, the trial court determined that the oral 
agreement contained no express terms concerning the duration of 
employment and granted the employer summary judgment. 
Affirming the summary judgment, this Court set forth the 
general parameters of the doctrine: 
The general rule concerning personal 
employment contracts is, in the absence of 
some further express or implied stipulation 
as to the duration of the employment or of 
good consideration in addition to the 
services contracted to be rendered, the 
contract is no more than an indefinite 
general hiring which is terminable at the 
will of either party. 
Id. at 792. 
Rose v. Allied Development Company, 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 
1986), leaves no doubt that Utah continues to abide by the rule 
set forth in Bihlmaier. In Rose, the Utah Supreme Court 
reiterated the standards set forth in Bihlmaier, emphasizing 
that employment is "at-will11 unless there is a: 1) Stipulation 
as to the duration of the employment; or 2) Additional 
consideration. Id,, at 792. 
A, The Uncontroverted Evidence Is That Healev's 
Employment Was Not For A Specific Period Of Time. 
In Rose v. Allied Development Company, 719 P.2d 83 
(Utah 1986), this Court explained the first exception to the 
general wat-willM doctrine: An express or implied stipulation 
as to the duration of the employment. In Rose the employee 
argued that while he was initially hired for an indefinite 
period, subsequent representations made by his boss about his 
ability to work and attend school transformed the contract into 
a contract for a definite period terminable only for just 
cause. Applying Bihlmaier, the Rose Court rejected the 
employee's argument noting that while representations may have 
been made, the employee was unable to establish that the 
representations went to the duration of the employment 
relationship. Id. at 85. 
Even the existence of company policies which go to the 
issue of discharge is not sufficient to imply a contract for a 
specific period of employment. The distinction between 
generalized company policies and an implied stipulation as to 
duration was most recently addressed by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Bruno v. Plateau Mining Company, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 
89 (Dec. 22, 1987). In Bruno the court affirmed a summary 
judgment in favor of the employer in a wrongful discharge case 
brought by an employee who was fired for fighting. The 
employee argued that the company had violated its policy of 
only suspending employees for fighting, and not discharging 
them, and that his termination was therefore wrong. The court 
held that even a personnel policy favoring suspension rather 
than termination was insufficient to establish an employer's 
intention to relinquish its right to terminate employees at 
will. The court noted: 
Even if we assume that Plateau [the 
employer] has a de facto personnel policy of 
not terminating employees who fight in its 
mines, this practice alone is not enough to 
establish Plateau's intentional surrender of 
its right to terminate Bruno's employment at 
will. 
Id. at 91. 
Importantly, Rose also requires that the stipulation 
as to duration must be recognized by both parties. This Court 
explained that a stipulation as to duration must be established 
by more than subjective understandings or expectations of the 
employee. Id. at 86. For example, in Rose this Court 
concluded that the plaintiff's belief that he would not be 
terminated while he attended school, based on conversations 
with his supervisor concerning his continuing education, was 
insufficient to establish a stipulation as to duration and 
remove the employee from the at will employment category. 
Here, Healey was unable to present any evidence that 
there was a stipulation as to the duration of her employment, 
or that continued employment was something other than her own 
subjective understanding or hope. (Leavitt Dep., p. 27-28; 
Healey Dep., Vol. 2, p. 83-84). Instead, Healey has resorted 
to arguing, citing to case authority from other jurisdictions, 
that a contract was created by D.F.G. through the vague 
statements on job security made in the handout. (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 10-12). However, this is the very argument that is 
specifically rejected by the court in Bruno. Id. at 90. The 
issue is not whether some general employment policies had been 
enacted, but whether the employer has specifically given up its 
right to terminate its employees "at-will". 
The three page handout simply offers no support for 
the argument that D.F.G. has given up this right. The handout 
contains absolutely no statements that Healey1s employment 
would be for a specific period of time. The handout merely 
explains the company's policy with respect to such things as 
fair treatment, discrimination, holidays, vacations, medical 
insurance, discipline, sick leave, and funeral leave. Granted, 
Scott admitted that the company considered itself and its 
employees bound by the handout (Scott Dep., p. 36-37). 
However, this just means that all employees are entitled to 
receive the stipulated sick leave# holiday and vacation time, 
and other specifically enumerated benefits. These benefits do 
not constitute a stipulation as to duration of employment/ and 
indeed are not even at issue, as Healey admitted she received 
all of the benefits set forth in the handout to which she was 
entitled. (Healey Dep./ Vol. 3/ p. 52-54). 
There is no dispute, factual or legal/ but that Healey 
was hired as an employee-at-will. Although she was later 
promoted to a supervisory function/ she never received a 
written agreement/ nor was she ever told that she would be 
employed for a specific period of time. At all times, Healey 
had the right to leave her employment at D.F.G. if she felt 
dissatisfied with her situation. The nature of the employment 
relationship was not changed just because Healey believed that 
she could not be terminated "at-will.H The D.F.G. handout on 
which Healey relies contains no specific guarantees as to 
duration of employment. As in Bruno, mere allegations by Healey 
are insufficient/ as a matter of law# to support a claim under 
the first exception recognized in Bihlmaier and Rose. 
B. Healey Failed to Offer Evidence of Additional 
Consideration Sufficient to Remove her from the 
Employment-at-Will Category 
Under Bihlmaier and Rose, there is a second exception 
to the employment-at-will doctrine: Additional consideration. 
According to this Court in Rose, to show additional good 
consideration, the employee must prove that she offered 
"something more than what [she] was already obligated to do 
under [her] employment agreement." id. 86. Additionally, Rose 
requires that the consideration "result in a detriment to the 
employee and a benefit to the employer." Id. Applying these 
requirements the Court in Rose noted that while the plaintiff 
incurred expenses for tuition and books, the employer did not 
accrue a corresponding benefit. Id. at 86. While Healey 
cites cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that 
continued employment alone is sufficient to constitute 
additional consideration, this is simply not the law in Utah. 
Healey introduced absolutely no evidence of 
"additional consideration". The undisputed facts established 
that Healey performed her job and was paid for doing so. She 
performed no additional services nor undertook any extra work 
or responsibilities. Nor is there evidence that Healey gave up 
another job to work at D.F.G., or gave up other career 
opportunities to continue her employment there. (Healey Dep., 
Vol. 1, p. 5). In short, Healey presented no evidence to 
establish either a detriment to herself or a corresponding 
benefit to D.F.G. As the trial court found, there was nothing 
which would fit Healey into the second exception expressed in 
Bihlmaier and Rose. 
The uncontroverted facts established that Healey was 
an employee at will. As such, D.F.G. had the right to 
terminate her for any or no reason at all, without incurring 
any liability. Accordingly, Healey had no cause of action 
against D.F.G. arising from her discharge and the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment in favor of D.F.G. 
C. Appellants Reliance on the Doctrine of 
Promissory Estoppel is Improper. 
Appellant argues that even if she is unable to come 
within the Rose exceptions, she can recover from D.F.G. under 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. This argument is raised 
for the first time on appeal, and accordingly, this Court is 
precluded from considering it. "It is axiomatic that defenses 
and claims not raised by the parties in the trial cannot be 
considered for the first time on appeal." Bangerter v. 
Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983). 
Additionally, the uncontroverted facts show that 
Healey has not proven at least two of the elements of this 
cause of action. Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, cited with approval in Rose v. Allied Development 
Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986), sets forth the elements of 
promissory estoppel. 
A promise which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or 
forebearance on the part of the promisee and 
which does induce such action or 
forebearance is binding if injustice can be 
avoided only by enforcement of the promise• 
In Rose, this Court stated that the promise of 
continued employment Mwould require more than [the employee's] 
subjective understanding" that the statements made by the 
employer constituted a promise• id. at 87. There has to be a 
finding that the assumptions of the employee were justified. 
As in Rose, Healey presented no evidence that there was 
something more than her "subjective understanding" that she 
would not be terminated. As discussed in detail in the 
previous sections of this brief, the handout merely contains 
some general work rules and benefits, but does not limit 
D.F.G,'s right to terminate its employees. Appellant's 
argument that because D.F.G. was bound by these work rules a 
••promise of continued employment existed" is therefore 
unpersuasive. (Appellant's Brief, page 17). 
Appellant also presented no evidence that D.F.G.'s 
alleged promise induced action or forebearance on her part. 
She left no other job, forewent no career opportunities, nor 
took any other action in reliance on the alleged "promise." 
She simply went to work at D.F.G. for as long as she had a 
job. (Healey Dep., Vol. 1, p. 5). 
Finally-/ as this Court concluded in Rose, the facts of 
this case compared to those in Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck 
Center, Inc., 354 P.2d 559 (Utah 1960)/ simply do not warrant 
recovery. In Bullock, the plaintiff had incurred substantial 
out-of-pocket expenses, sold his house, moved/ and accepted 
reduced benefits and salary in reliance on his understanding of 
the employment agreement. Yet the Court denied recovery. The 
Rose Court's comments regarding Bullock are applicable here: 
Certainly, the equities in Bullock favored 
an estoppel as a way of compensating the 
plaintiff for his considerable out-of-pocket 
expenses incurred in reliance on his 
understanding of the employment agreement. 
Nevertheless, we refused to override the 
at-will doctrine to imply a term of 
employment in the contract to which the 
employer had not expressly agreed. 
Id. at 87 (emphasis added). 
If the doctrine of promissory estoppel was 
inapplicable in Bullock, and Rose, this Court must reject the 
application of the doctrine on the weaker facts presented in 
the instant case. The Court should therefore affirm the 
summary judgment. 
D. The Public Policy Exception to the At-Will 
Employment Relationship is Inapplicable in this 
Case. 
Appellant also argues that her discharge by D.F.G. 
contravened a broad concept of public policy. This argument is 
unpersuasive for several reasons. 
First, even if the Utah courts recognized such an 
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, it would not 
apply here because the reason for Healey1s discharge cannot be 
construed, by any stretch of the imagination, as contravening 
public policy. Notwithstanding her unsupported allegations, 
Healey was uncontrovertibly discharged for a valid business 
reason: D.F.G. could not afford to lose a more valuable 
employee, Gray, its production manager, who would have quit 
unless Healey was terminated. Healey was simply not discharged 
for attempting to help a fellow employee obtain unemployment 
benefits. (Gray Dep., p. 15; Leavitt Dep., p. 32-33; Scott 
Dep., p. 51-52). Termination for a valid business reason 
cannot, and does not, contravene public policy. 
The distinction between a violation of public policy 
and the deterioration of an employee-employer relationship 
justifying a discharge was illustrated in Abrisz v. Pullev 
Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978). Like Healey, 
the plaintiff in Abrisz wrote a letter ostensibly to aid a 
fellow employee seeking unemployment benefits. However, the 
letter was based on inaccurate facts and was extremely critical 
of the employer and its practices. The company learned of the 
letter when it became part of the hearing record. 
Subsequently, the company vice president sent a letter to the 
plaintiff terminating her employment and explaining: 
The letter [on behalf of the plaintiffs 
co-worker] appeared to contain 
mis-statements which were calculated to 
influence the outcome of the hearing and 
which reflected on the integrity of Pulley 
Freight Lines, Inc. Subsequent to the 
hearing we were provided a copy of your 
letter which confirmed the erroneous and 
prejudicial nature of the statements 
referred to at the hearing. 
Id. at 456. 
The plaintiff brought suit alleging that her discharge 
contravened public policy. The appellate court affirmed the 
trial court decision in favor of the employer, holding that the 
plaintiff did not establish a violation of public policy. 
"Courts should not declare conduct violative of public policy 
unless it is clearly so. . .In considering this matter we keep 
in mind that the rights of the employer, as well as those of 
the employee, are important." Id. The court explained that 
while the letter was the occasion for plaintiffs discharge, 
the company's actions were not violative of public policy 
because the relationship between the employee and employer had 
been destroyed. Thus, the employer was justified in 
discharging the plaintiff. 
The facts of this case parallel the facts in Abrisz. 
D.F.G. presented uncontroverted testimony that a personality 
conflict existed between Healey and her direct supervisor and 
production manager, Gray. (See Statement of Undisputed Facts, 
p. 4). Healey's letter resulted in her discharge because it 
undermined the fragile relationship between her and Gray, 
D.F.G. should be allowed to discharge employees to ensure 
continued production and its own business future, without being 
second guessed. 
Even if the facts are as recited by Healey, she can 
point to no "public policy" which has been violated. At best 
Healey relies on broad statements found in the Utah Employment 
Security Act. However, Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-11 merely 
enumerates the investigatory duties of the commission while 
§ 35-4-2 declares unemployment to be a public concern. The Act 
does not, however, provide the specificity which other courts 
have required as a prerequisite to declaring a public policy 
exception. 
The jurisdictions that have recognized a public policy 
exception construe it very narrowly, and require as a threshold 
showing, a 'clear mandate' of public policy to preserve the 
powers of each governmental branch. Parnar v. American Hotels, 
652 P.2d 625 (Hawaii 1982); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 
685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984). Palmateer v. International 
Harvester, 421 N.E. 2d 876 (111. 1981). Broad general 
statements of policy contained in a statute are insufficient to 
support a claim under the exception. Lampe v. Presbyterian 
Medical Center, 590 P.2d 513 (Col. App. 1978) (Colorado statute 
allowing State Board of Nursing to discipline nurses for 
negligent or willful actions was insufficient to attribute to 
the legislature an intent to change the relationship between 
employer and employee); Cain v. Kansas Corp. Commission; 673 
P.2d 451 (Kan. App. 1983) (public employee terminated for 
outspoken advocacy of consumers did not come within a public 
policy exception despite broad policy statements of Securities 
Act that employee's role was to implement agencies' policy). 
The public policy exception to the employment-at-will 
doctrine has been allowed only in very narrow circumstances/ 
usually when a direct violation of a statute has occurred or a 
clear public policy exists. See Petermann v. International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1959); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (employee 
discharged for refusing to evade jury duty); Harless v. First 
National Bank 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (employee terminated 
for refusing to violate a consumer credit code; Brown v. 
Transcon Lines, 588 P.2d 1087 (Or. 1978) (employee fired for 
filing claim under worker's compensation statute); Tamenv v. 
Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (employee 
discharged for refusing to engage in price fixing). 
Appellant's argument for a broad public policy 
exception to the general at-will employment rule also ignores 
the problems that could result if businesses were faced with 
litigation and damages every time an employer decided to 
discharge an employee. Even professor Blades, who promotes an 
expansion of exceptions to the general rule in his article, 
Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the 
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L.Rev, 1404 
(1967), recognized the adverse effect such litigation would 
have on the employers business. 
[T]here is the danger that the average jury 
will identify with and therefore believe, 
the employee. This possibility could give 
rise to vexatious lawsuits by disgruntled 
employees fabricating plausible tales of 
employer coercion. If the potential for 
vexatious suits by discharged employees is 
too great, employers will be inhibited in 
exercising their best judgment as to which 
employees should or should not be 
retained. . . [T]he employer's prerogative 
to make independent, good faith judgments 
about employees is important in our free 
enterprise system. 
id. at 1428. 
Others have expressed concern about a state's economic 
environment when considering an expansion of the public policy 
exception. The deteriorating business climate of the state was 
a concern for the dissent in Palmateer v. International 
Harvester, 421 N.E.2d 876 (111. 1981): 
It must be acknowledged, however, that 
Illinois is not attracting a great amount of 
new industry and business and that 
industries are leaving the state at a 
troublesome rate, I do not believe that 
this court should further contribute to the 
declining business environment by creating a 
vague concept of public policy which will 
permit an employer to discharge an unwanted 
employee, one who could be completely 
disruptive of labor management 
relations. . • only at the risk of being 
sued in tort not only for compensatory 
damages, but also for punitive damages. 
Id. at 885 (Ryan, J., dissenting.) 
In short, appellant demands that this Court take on 
the role which it has specifically refused to assume. As this 
Court stated in Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953 (Utah 1983): 
It is the power and responsibility of the 
legislature to enact laws to promote public 
health, safety, morals, and general welfare 
of society,. . . and this Court will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the 
Legislature with respect to what best serves 
the public interest. The adjustment and 
accommodation of conflicting interests, such 
as are involved in this case, are for the 
Legislature to resolve, irrespective of the 
rules applied by other states. 
Id. at 956. 
A public policy departure from the at-will employment 
rule could result in the very unemployment burden the 
Unemployment Act was created to avoid as businesses relocate or 
close when faced with liability and damages merely for 
discharging an employee. Whether such risk should be assumed 
by eviscerating the doctrine of employment-at-will is a 
decision for the legislature and not the courts. 
POINT II 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT HEALEY WAS NOT AN 
EMPLOYEE AT WILL, GOOD CAUSE EXISTED FOR HER 
DISCHARGE. 
Even if Healey was not an employee at-will, summary 
judgment was still proper because the undisputed facts 
establish that good or just cause existed for her discharge. 
Thus, the undisputed facts establish that there was a valid 
business reason for Healey's discharge, (i.e. Mgood or just 
cause"). Therefore, the trial court could rule as a matter of 
law that her discharge was proper. 
Although the concept of "just cause" is difficult to 
define, the Ohio Supreme Court in Harp v. Administrator, Bureau 
of Unemployment Compensation, 12 Ohio Misc. 34, 230 N.E.2d 376 
(Ohio 1967), offered an extremely workable definition. The 
Ohio court concluded that "'just cause* means that if an 
impartial person examined all the facts and circumstances of 
the case, he would conclude that the discharge was merited." 
Here, an examination of the undisputed facts leads to 
the inescapable conclusion that Healey's discharge was 
justified. Everyone, including Healey, acknowledged that a 
severe personality conflict existed between Healey and Gray. 
(Healey Dep., Vol. 2, p. 108-109). Further, it is undisputed 
that D.F.G. made considerable efforts to resolve this dispute 
by holding meetings between Gray and Healey and between Healey 
and the plant manager, Leavitt. Notwithstanding these efforts 
at reconciliation, the dispute was brought "to a head" by 
Healey's letter which directly and personally attacked Gray. 
This letter angered and upset Gray, who concluded that she 
could no longer work with Healey. Gray informed Leavitt and 
Scott that she was quitting. Leavitt and Scott decided that 
they could not afford to lose their production manager, and 
that the only solution was to discharge Healey. This was the 
only alternative available because there were no positions or 
jobs available to which Healey could have been assigned that 
would have removed her from contact with Gray. (See Statement 
of Undisputed Facts, p. 6). 
In short, Healey was discharged so that D.F.G.vs 
production could continue unimpeded. Such a reason irrefutably 
constitutes a valid business justification for Healey's 
discharge. An employer has the right to discharge any 
employee, even one who is not "at-will" when good or just cause 
exists. Therefore, there is no legal basis whatsoever for 
Healey's claims, even if she arguably was not an 
employee-at-will. 
While the existence of good cause may be factual/ 
Healey failed to offer any evidence to contradict D.F.G.'s 
reasons (the facts) for her termination. That is, she has 
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. "The mere 
assertion that an issue of fact exists without a proper 
evidentiary foundation to support that assertion is 
insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary judgment." 
Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). Thus, 
summary judgment in favor of D0FeG. was appropriate even if 
this Court concludes that good or just cause was required 
before Healey could be discharged. 
POINT III 
HEALEY FAILED TO ESTABLISH FACTS TO SUPPORT 
HER CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
Appellant's complaint also stated a cause of action 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of 
D.F.G.'s intentional termination of her employment. However, 
Healey failed to offer any evidence to prove the elements of 
this tort. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress in Samms v. 
Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 346 (Utah 1961): 
Our study of the authorities, and of the 
arguments advanced, convinces us that, 
conceding such a cause of action may not be 
based upon mere negligence, the best 
considered view recognizes an action for 
severe emotional distress . . . where the 
defendant intentionally engaged in some 
conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the 
purpose of inflicting emotional distress, 
or, (b) where any reasonable person would 
have known that such would result; and his 
actions are of such a nature as to be 
considered outrageous and intolerable in 
that they offend against the generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality. 
Comment HdH to Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, (cited with approval in Pentecost v. Harward, 699 
P.2d 696 (Utah 1985)), emphasizes the degree to which a 
defendant's conduct must exceed all reasonable bounds: 
Liability has been found only where the 
conduct has been so outrageous in character, 
and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond 
all possible bounds of decency, and to be 
regarded as atrocious, and utterly 
intolerable in civilized community. 
Generally, the case is one in which the 
recitation of facts to an average member of 
the community would arouse his resentment 
against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 
"Outrageous!M 
This Court recently stated that a discharge from 
employment, even a wrongful one, does not rise to the level of 
outrageous conduct necessary to establish an intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. In Sperber v. Galigher Ash 
Company, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (November 25, 1987), the plaintiff 
brought suit against his employer of eleven years, asserting 
wrongful discharge, breach of an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing under the collective bargaining agreement, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress• The trial court 
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding 
that the under Utah law the plaintiff had failed to state a 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. 
at 3. This Court affirmed, holding that even if the 
plaintiff's version of the facts was true, the plaintiff had 
failed to state a claim for relief. "Mere discharge from 
employment does not constitute outrageous or intolerable 
conduct by an employer . . . Undoubtedly, every employee who 
believes he has a legitimate grievance concerning his discharge 
from employment experiences some emotional anguish as a result 
of that belief." Id. at 4-5. This Court suggested that the 
employer's actions would have to be as outlandish as damaging 
the employee's car to rise to the necessary level of 
outrageousness. 
Here, as in Sperber, the uncontroverted facts show 
that the discharge was handled in a thoughtful and sensitive 
manner. Healey was approached on a Friday afternoon, by Gray 
and Leavitt, after virtually all other employees had left the 
factory. She was calmly told that she was being terminated and 
was given the reasons for her termination. She was then paid 
all back wages and other benefits which were due and owing to 
her. (Healey Dep., Vol. 2, p. 52-54). Finally, her discharge 
was reviewed by both the president of D.F.G. and by an outside 
arbitrator. (Scott Dep., p. 37-38). As a matter of law, the 
actions of D.F.G. are neither atrocious nor intolerable. 
Accordingly, even if this Court concludes that summary 
judgment was erroneous on appellant's breach of contract 
claims, summary judgment with respect to the claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress should be affirmed. 
POINT IV. 
DAMAGES FOR INJURY TO REPUTATION ARE NOT 
RECOVERABLE IN A BREACH OF EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACT CASE. 
Healey*s complaint also sought damages for an alleged 
injury to her reputation. However, she was unable to provide 
any evidence of damage to her reputation. Thus, summary 
judgment should be affirmed because the M[m]ere assertion that 
an issue of fact exists without proper evidentiary foundation 
to support that assertion is insufficient to preclude granting 
summary judgment." Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983). 
During the course of Healey's deposition, the only 
-damage" that she expressed was an ill-defined and 
unsubstantiated claim that she was having difficulty finding a 
job: 
Question (Mr. Strindberg): Will you explain 
to me what you mean by the term damage to 
your reputation? 
Answer (Healey): Well, the damages that 
I've seen to my reputation like I mentioned 
before, it's harder for a person my age to 
go out and try to get a job. And when I 
fill out application forms, I put down the 
reasons why I left my previous job. I put 
fired on there and put down the reason why I 
was fired. And, it just seems that I get a 
call back on every one of them. They want 
more information on my part of the 
personality conflict, that they felt that if 
I had the problem there, I would also have a 
problem at the new job. So, it was always 
there, no matter when I went. 
Question (Mr. Strindberg): Is there any 
other way that your reputation has. been 
damaged? 
Answer (Healey): I can't think of any. 
Deposition of Healey, Vol. 2, p. 91-92. 
Furthermore, as a matter of law, Healey is not 
entitled to recover damages for injury to reputation inasmuch 
as the gravamen of her Complaint was a breach of an employment 
contract. Courts have uniformly held that such damages are not 
awardable in breach of contract suits. O'Leary v. Sterling 
Extruder Corp., 533 F.Supp. 1205, 1209 (E.D. Wise. 1982); 
Skagway School Board v. Davis, 543 P.2d 218 (Alaska 1975). 
In Skagway, the court explained the two primary 
reasons for the general rule prohibiting damages for injury to 
reputation in a breach of employment contract suit: (1) The 
computation of damages for injury to reputation is speculative; 
and (2) Such damages cannot reasonably be assumed to be within 
the contemplation of the parties when they entered into the 
contract. Id. at 225. The court went on to analyze how 
damages for injury to reputation fall outside of the limits set 
forth in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 EX. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 
(1854). The Court concluded that the refusal to award damages 
for injury to reputation in an employment contract is 
particularly inappropriate "for entities which enter into a 
relatively small number of contracts which may not be presumed 
to be very sophisticated about the law of contract or the 
liability stemming from the breach." id. at 227. 
The reasons cited in Skaaway are particularly apt in 
this situation. D.F.G. is not a large or sophisticated 
company. Accordingly, even if D.F.G. has been guilty of breach 
of an employment contract, such damages should be limited to 
what Healey could have reasonably expected to earn, minus any 
actual earnings which she has received or should have received. 
POINT V 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE NOT APPROPRIATE IN THIS 
CASE. 
A. Punitive Damages Are Not Recoverable in a Breach 
of Contract Action. 
The law in Utah, as well as in other states, is that 
punitive damages are not recoverable in a breach of contract 
action. As this court stated in Hal Taylor Associates v. 
UnionAmerican Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982): 
We prefer the standard articulated by the 
Kansas Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. Allstate 
Insurance Company, 217 Kansas 262, 535 P.2d 
919 (1975), which states that breach of 
contract, standing alone, does not call for 
punitive damages, even if intentional and 
unjustified. . . . 
Id. at 750. 
Other courts have concluded that this prohibition 
against an award of punitive damages is applicable in wrongful 
discharge/ breach of employment contract cases, even if there 
was a bad motive underlying the discharge. Kamlar Corp. v. 
Haley, 299 S.E. 2d 514 (Va. 1983); Eklund v. Vincent Brass & 
Aluminum Co.. 351 N.W. 2d 371 (Minn. 1984). The reasoning 
behind this prohibition is the same as that underlying the 
prohibition against damages for injury to reputation: Damages 
for an alleged breach of contract should be limited to those 
which flow directly and foreseeably from the breach . See, 
Eklund. 
The basis for Healey's charges against D.F.G. are for 
breach of an alleged employment contract. Plaintiff has 
presented absolutely no evidence of an independent tort which 
would support punitive damages• Indeed, the whole manner in 
which plaintiff's termination was handled (i.e. no action was 
taken without considerable forethought and the discharge was 
handled in a tactful and appropriate manner) belies any 
contention that D.F.G. acted in a tortious manner, (See 
Statement of Undisputed Facts, p. 6). 
Additionally, even if this Court recognizes a public 
policy exception to the employment at will doctrine, punitive 
damages would still be inappropriate. In Vigil v. Arizola, 699 
P.2d 613 (N.M. App. 1983), the court recognized a public policy 
exception where the plaintiff asserted retaliatory discharge in 
connection with his reports of his employer's misuse of state 
and federal money. However, the court refused to allow the 
plaintiff to recover punitive damages because the employer 
could not have anticipated beforehand that the public policy 
claim would be actionable. Id. at 621. 
Accordingly, even if this court should find summary 
judgment was improper with respect to Healey's contract claims, 
punitive damages should be disallowed. 
B. Assuming, Arguendo, that Healey's Claims are 
Based in Tort, the Evidence Does Not Raise a 
Material Issue of Fact as to Whether Punitive 
Damages Were Appropriate. 
In Behrens v. Raleigh Hills HOSP., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 
(Utah 1983), this Court stated the prevalent rule on punitive 
damages: compensatory damages are generally appropriate while 
punitive damages are proper only in exceptional cases. Id, at 
1186. The court explained: 
Our cases have generally held that 
punitive damages may be awarded only on 
proof of 'willful and malicious1 conduct, . 
. . or on proof of conduct which manifests a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward, 
and disregard of the rights of others, . • . 
Punitive damages should be awarded 
infrequently. Simple negligence will never 
suffice as a basis upon which such damages 
may be awarded. (Citations omitted.) 
Applied to the facts of this case, Healey failed to 
offer any evidence that D.F.G.'s conduct was willful and 
malicious. The uncontroverted testimony established that 
Healey was discharged because of a personality conflict with 
her supervisor. Moreover, the action was a valid business 
decision made after considerable thought by management, and was 
handled in a very considerate and thoughtful manner. Accord-
ingly, punitive damages are not appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts establish that Healey was an "at-will" 
employee. During the time that she worked for D.F.G. she never 
entered into a contract, oral or written, that provided for a 
specific period of employment and provided no additional 
consideration which could support a claim of a right to 
continued employment. Furthermore, her termination was not 
violative of public policy/ but was necessitated by a valid 
business reason. While discharge from a job is never pleasant, 
courts should be cautious of imposing liability on a business 
under these circumstances. 
The trial court carefully reviewed all of the facts 
and circumstances surrounding Healey's discharge and applied 
the proper legal standards in ruling that Healey was an 
employee-at-will whose discharge was proper. 
For the reasons stated above. Respondent respectfully 
urges the Court to reaffirm the summary judgment in favor of 
Respondent, and award it costs and expenses incurred in 
defending against this Appeal. 
DATED this &'<£:* day of March/ 1988. 
PRINCE/ YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
John S. Chindlund .—^  
Erik Strindberg ^^J 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District,'"\j: 
IN AND FOR THE ,„.., .„„ -
 r„ ... .,. 
County of Davis, State of Utah--- .-••,;,. c EPK 
4 U » w C bl\ 1 
itissi. 
CHARLOTTE HEALY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
D.F.G., INC., 
Defendant. 
BY. 
U:.; ~ i T k,-
RULING ON MOTION 
Civil No. 38293 
The defendant's motion for summary judgment came before the 
court for oral argument on July 14, 1987. Jack C. Helgesen 
appeared as attorney for the plaintiff and John Chindlund 
appeared as attorney for the defendant. After oral argument, the 
court took the motion under advisement. The court has reviewed 
the submitted depositions, and now rules on the motion. 
The paramount issue facing this court is whether or not 
plaintiff was an employee of the defendant who was terminable "at 
will." 
An employment at will contract allows both parties to 
terminate the contract at any time, without justification. Most 
employment contracts are of this type. There are certain 
exceptions to this rule, most notably the federal prohibitions on 
discharges based on race, color, religion, sex, nationality, age 
or handicap. See Civil Rights Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. 
2000e2(a)(l), and U.S.A., 1953, 34-35-6. Also, good consideration 
in addition to the services to be rendered might be enough to 
overcome the "at will" categorization. This consideration must 
result in a detriment to the employee and a benefit to the 
employer. Rose vs. Allied Development Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 
1986). However, absent these factors or an express or implied 
FILMED 
stipulation to the contrary, "the contract is no more than an 
indefinite general hiring which is terminable at the will of 
either party." (Bihlmaier vs. Carson, 603 P. 2d 792 (Utah 1979). 
The court has carefully reviewed the circumstances of this 
case and can find nothing to indicate that the plaintiff was 
employed under a contract other than one terminable at the will 
of either party. There is nothing indicating a length of 
employment and no claim arising under discrimination. 
Plaintiff's interpretation of the nature of the three page 
company handout is not enough: 
The existence of an employment agreement not terminable 
at will must be established by more than subjective 
understandings or expectations. Rose at 86. 
The court must look to the entirety of the circumstances in 
making its determination of the nature of the employment. 
It is not the court's intention to rule upon the propriety 
of the defendant's actions; under well established Utah law the 
plaintiff was terminable at the will of the defendant and no 
showing of cause is therefore required. 
The defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby 
granted. 
The defendant is ordered to draw a formal order consistent 
with this ruling. 
Dated August 7, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Jack C. Helgesen, 4768 
Harrison Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84403 and John Chindlund, Third Floor 
MONY Plaza, 424 East Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on 
August 7, 1987. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLOTTE HEALEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
D.F.G., INC,, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant • 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 38293 
Judge Douglas Cornaby 
fEATES 
AHLER 
, Suite 900 
jrth South 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for 
hearing before the Court, Honorable Douglas Cornaby, District 
Judge, presiding, on July 14, 1987, at 3:30 p.m. Plaintiff was 
represented by Jack C. Helgesen and defendant was represented 
by John S. Chindlund. Having heard oral argument, reviewed the 
memoranda filed by the parties and the depositions and other 
pleadings on file with the Court, and having examined the 
entirety of the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's 
employment, the Court hereby enters the following as its 
findings of fact and conlusions of law and judgment: 
FILMED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff's employment by defendant was as an 
employee-at-will, and, as such, her employment was terminable 
by defendent without any requirement that defendant have good 
or just cause therefore. 
2. The undisputed facts provide no evidence to 
support any exceptions to take plaintiff's employment out of 
the category of employment-at-will. Specifically, there is no 
evidence (a) that plaintiff's discharge was discriminatory 
under or violative of any Federal or State law; (b) that 
plaintiff provided or performed any additional services 
resulting in a detriment to her or benefit to defendant,
 #(c) 
that plaintiff and defendant had an express or implied contract 
of employment other than one for an indefinite period 
terminable at the will of either party; (d) that the written 
materials (hand out) provided to plaintiff by defendant 
established a contract of employment, notwithstanding the 
subjective understanding or expectations of plaintiff; or (e) 
that plaintiff's termination was violative of any State or 
Federal public policy. 
JUDGMENT 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, it is ordered and adjudged that plaintiff's 
Complaint be, and the same hereby is, dismissed with prejudice 
rEATES 
IHLER 
Suite 900 
irth South - 2 -
and in its entirety, with the parties to bear their own costs 
and attorneys' fees. 
DATED this ,XL^ day of August, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
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APPROVED: 
Jack C. Helgesen 
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LABOR—INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
of Ttali , 1!>39, r e ly ing to unemployment 
compensation; and providing ior other re-
lated purposes.—L. 1941, eh. 40. 
Constitutionality. 
Unemployment Compensation Law (35-
4-1 et seq.) is not unconstitutional as not 
clearly expressing its subject mat ter in its 
title. * Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. In-
dustrial Comtn., PS I ' . 36, 91 P. 2d 512. 
Unemployment Compensation Law does 
not impair contract vt employee with em-
ployer which existed for some time prior 
to enactment of the law. Globe Grain & 
Milling Co. v. Industrial Comm., 9S U. 3G, 
91 P. 2d 512. 
Unemployment Compensation Law is 
not un. onsiitutunial a& \ i u l a t i \ e of due 
process of law, whether it be enacted in 
exercise of taking power or police power. 
Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. Industr ia l 
Comm., 9$ U. 3G, 91 P. 2d 512. 
Procedure. 
Each record of trial under this law 
should be complete in and of itself, and 
each element necessarv to sustain an order 
by the tribunal or commission should be 
supported by testimony, exhibits or s t ip u . 
lation introduced at the hearing, the rule 
being no different than in industrial acci-
dents. Roberis v. Industrial Comm., 97 TJ 
434. 93 P. 2d 494. 
Rights under Employment Security Act 
(35-4-1 et seq.) are purely statutory, p r o . 
cedure i> statutory, and deputy, 'appeal 
tribunal and commission have only such 
authority as is cxpiessly granted. National 
Tunnel & Mines Co. v. Industrial Comm 
99 U. 39. 102 P. 2d 50?, distinguished in 
117 U. 471, 217 P. 2d 5C(. 
Collateral References. 
Social Security and Public WelfareC=» 
251. 
b) C..7.S. Social Sccuritv and Public 
Welfare §§ 75-252. 
One who uses his own truck as an in-
dependent contractor or an employee of 
concern for which he transports goods, 
wilhin Social Security or Unemployment 
Compensation Act, 144 A. L. R. 740, 151 
A. L. R. 1331. 
35-4-2. Public policy—General welfare requires creation of unemploy-
ment reserves—Employment offices.—As a guide to the interpretation and 
application of this act, the public policy of this state is declared to be as 
follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to 
the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this stale. Unemploy-
ment is therefore a subject of general interest and concern which requires 
appropriate action by the legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten 
its burden which now so often falls with crushing force upon the unem-
ployed worker and his family. The achievement of social security requires 
protection against this greatest hazard of our economic life. This objec-
tive can be furthered by operating free public employment offices in affilia-
tion with a nation-wide system of employment services, by devising appro-
priate methods for reducing the volume of unemployment and by the 
systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment from 
which benefits may be paid for periods of unemployment, thus maintain-
ing purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of un-
employment. The legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered 
judgment the public good, and the general welfare of the citizens of this 
state require the enactment of this measure, under the police power of 
the state, for the establishment and maintenance of free public employ-
ment offices and for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment re-
serves to be used for the benefit of unemployed persons. 
History: 
42-2a*2. 
L. 1941, cli. 40, § 2 ; C. 1943, 
Constitutional basis. 
The Unemployment Compensation Law 
(3."-4-J et SQ{\.) was enaered under and as 
an exercise of the police power of the 
s tate . Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. In-
dustrial Comm., 104 U. 17o, 134 P. 2d 479, 
reh. den. 104 U. 196, 141 P. 2d 694. 
Liberal construction. 
The Employment Security Act (3o-4-l 
et seq.), being remedial under the police 
35-4-10 LABOR-INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Court" and deleted the former sixth sentence 
which read: "The actions and the questions cer-
tified shall be heard in a summary manner and 
shall be given precedence over all other civil 
cases except cases arising under the Work-
men's Compensation Law under this state."; 
ANALYSIS 
Appeals to board of review. 
Disputed evidence. 
Due process of law. 
Evidence at hearing. 
Judicial review. 
Standard of review. 
Timely filing. 
Cued.* 
Appeals to board of review. 
On appeal from a decision of an appeals ref-
eree, the board of review is not bound by the 
findings of fact made by the referee even if sup-
ported by the evidence, but may make findings 
of its own based on the same or additional evi-
dence. Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review 
of Industrial Comm. (Utah 1977) 568 P 2d 727. 
The board of review is not limited to consid-
eration of that evidence previously submitted 
in the administrative process but may consider 
additional evidence as well. Box Elder County 
v. Industrial Comm. (Utah 1981 • 632 P 2d 839. 
Disputed evidence. 
The mere fact that some evidence is intro-
duced which disputes other evidence does not 
compel the conclusion that the board's decision 
is unsupported by any evidence. Young v. 
Board of Review, No. 860350 (Utah Sup. Ct. 
filed Dec. 16, 1986). 
Due process of law. 
Employer was not denied due process of law 
by fact that employees of the industrial com-
mission presided over the administrative hear-
ings on employer's liability for failing to file 
timely contribution reports. Vali Convalescent 
& Care Institution v. Industrial Comm. of 
Utah (Utah 1982) 649 P 2d 33. 
Evidence at hearing. 
This section and the regulations prescribed 
by the commission authorize departure from 
strict adherence to the hearsay rule at unem-
ployment compensation hearings; however, to 
be admissible, there must be some reasonable 
basis for inferring the reliability of hearsay ev-
idence, as gossip or rumor will not suffice as 
admissible evidence. Trotta v. Department of 
Employment Security (Utah 19S3) 664 P 2d 
1195. 
Judicial review. 
The court is to sustain the determination of 
and made various stylistic changes throughout 
the section. 
Meaning of "this act". — The phrase "tnig 
act" in the first sentence of Subsection la) firs! 
appeared in this section as enacted by Lawk 
1941. ch. 40, * 10. That act (Laws 1941,"ch. 4Q) 
enacted this chapter. 
the board of review unless the record clearlv 
and persuasively proves the action of the board 
was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. 
Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review of In. 
dustrial Comm. (Utah 1977) 568 P 2d 727. 
The supreme court must sustain the factual 
findings of the board of review if supported by 
substantial evidence: however, supreme court 
does not defer to the board's application of the 
legal standards unless the statutory language 
construed evinces a legislative intention to 
commit broad discretion to the administrative 
agency, or the agency, because of its expertise 
in a given area, is in a better position than the 
reviewing court to give content and meaning to 
the statutory terms. Trotta v. Department of 
Employment Security (Utah 1983) 664 P 2d 
1195. 
The commission's findings of fact are conclu-
sive and binding, and are to be sustained if 
supported by competent and substantial evi-
dence in the record. Northwest Foods Ltd. v. 
Board of Review, No. 20860 (Utah Sup. Ct. 
filed Dec. 5, 19861 
Standard of review. 
Finding by board of review that unemploy-
ment compensation claimant had knowingly 
failed to report a material fact regarding hours 
worked and or money earned, rendering him 
ineligible for further compensation, pursuant 
to the provisions of 35-4-5, would not be dis-
turbed by the supreme court on review where 
supported by competent evidence. Whitcome v. 
Department of Employment Security, Indus-
trial Comm. (Utah 1977) 564 P 2d 1116; Baker 
v. Department of Employment Security. Indus-
trial Comm. (Utah 197*7) 564 P 2d 1126. 
In judicial review by supreme court of deter-
mination made by the board of review, the evi-
dence is to be looked at in the light most favor-
able to the findings: and in so doing, if there is 
evidence of any substance whatever which can 
184 
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rea&onabh i>e regarded ah s.upporun£ the de- thai o; notices of appeal from judicial orders, is 
. termination madt. the determination must be jurisdictional. Leonczyn>ki \ Board of Review, 
affirmed Taylor v Department of Employment 713 p 2d 706 <Utah 1985' 
Security. Industrial Comm. <Ulah 1982> f>47 P The Department of Employment Secunn did 
, , , - . , not abuse its discretion in refu^inp to consider 
In reviewing board of review & determination , , . * 
that conduct of employee was not so culpable an_ ^ P 1 ^ P ^ e s t to the benefits awarded 
as to disauahfv him" from benefits on the w h e r e l n e P r o l e s l w a s n m f l i e d W l t h , n ^ n 
ground that ne was discharged for an act that d a v s Mini Spas, Inc v. Industrial Commn, No. 
was deliberate, willful or wanton and adverse 860212 (Utah Sup Ct. filed Feb. 3, 1987) 
to his employer's rightful interests, supreme An administrative law judge's refusal to con-
court employed an "intermediate" standard of sider an employer's untimely protest of a deter-
review. under which the boards decision must mination of benefits bv the department of em-
fall within the limits of reasonableness or ra-
 pl0vment security did not contravene a 
tionality under such standard, the board's de-
 d a ; m e d b h c f w r e h e v e a o f de_ 
cision wil be affirmed unless, as a matter of
 f , f - ^ ^ o r -excusable neglect." 
law. the decision was wronc because onlv the . , . , , , ,, . *
 K, 
opposite conclusion could be drawn from the M , n i *»**' } n L - v 1 " " ^ ™ ! Commn. No. 
facts. Citv of Orem v. Chnstensen (Utah 1984) 8 6 0 2 1 2 ( U t a h S uP- C t- f l l e d F e b - 3- 1 P S 7 ) -
ggo p OJ ouo 
~ """" Cited in Logan Regional Hosp. v. Board of 
Timely filing. Review. 723 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). 
The timeh filing of petitions of review, like 
35-4-11. Administration of Employment Security Act. 
(aHl» It is the duty of the Industrial Commission to administer this chap-
ter. The commission is entitled to adopt, amend, or rescind any rules and 
special orders, to employ persons, make expenditures, require reports, 
make investigations, make audits of any or all funds provided for under 
this chapter when necessary, and take any other action it considers neces-
sary or suitable to that end. The commission shall create the Department 
of Employment Security for the purpose of administering this chapter. All 
personnel of that department, including a full-time administrator, shall 
be employed on a nonpartisan merit basis. The full-time administrator 
shall, with the approval of the commission, determine the department's 
organization and methods of procedure in accordance with the provisions 
of this chapter, and he shall, under direction of the commission, supervise 
the department personnel and its operations. The Department of Employ-
ment Security shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed. 
Not later than the first day of October of each year, the commission shall 
submit to the governor a report covering the administration and opera-
tion of this chapter during the preceding calendar year and shall make 
any recommendations for amendments to this chapter as the commission 
considers proper. The report shall include a balance sheet of the moneys 
in the fund in which there shall be provided, if possible, a reserve against 
liability in future years to pay benefits in excess of the then current 
contributions, which reserve shall be set up by the commission in accor-
dance with accepted actuarial principles on the basis of statistics of em-
ployment, business activity, and other relevant factors for the longest 
possible period. Whenever the commission believes that a change in con-
tribution or benefit rates will become necessary to protect the solvency of 
the fund, it shall promptly inform the governor and the Legislature and 
make appropriate recommendations. 
(2) Any two commissioners constitute a quorum. No vacancy impairs 
the right of the remaining commissioners to exercise all the powers of the 
commission. 
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Ruies. 
(b> The commission may adopt, amend, or rescind rules in accordance w i ^ 
Chapter 46a, Title 63. The commission may adopt, amend, or rescind special 
orders after appropriate notice and opportunity to be heard Special orders 
become effective ten days after notification or mailing to the last known ad-
dress of the individuals or concerns affected thereby. 
Printing and Distribution of Act and Rules of Commission. 
ic) The commission shall cause to be printed for distribution to the public 
the text of this chapter, the commission's rules, its annual reports to the 
governor, and any other material the commission considers relevant and suit-
able and shall furnish the same to any person upon application. 
Personnel Merit System. 
id) The commission shall appoint on a nonpartisan merit basis, fix the 
compensation, and prescribe the duties and powers of officers, accountants, 
attorneys, experts, and other personnel as necessary in the performance of its 
duties. The commission shall provide for a merit system covering all those 
persons, classify and fix the minimum standards for the personnel and formu-
late salary schedules for the service so classified. The commission shall hold or 
provide for holding examinations to determine the technical and professional 
qualifications of applicants for positions in the commission, and provide for 
annual merit ratings of employees in the commission to ascertain whether the 
employees are maintaining the eligibility standards prescribed by the com-
mission and those promulgated by the social security board. No employee may 
be separated or demoted so long as he meets the eligibility standards of perfor-
mance; however, when a reduction in personnel is made because of lack of 
funds, curtailment of work, or the elimination of specific positions or classes of 
positions or identifiable programs, an employee thus separated, reclassified, 
or reassigned shall be separated, reclassified, or reassigned without prejudice 
and in accordance with an established separation formula based on merit 
system principles and tenure of service approved by the commission and the 
United States Department of Labor. The commission may delegate to any 
person so appointed the power and authority it considers reasonable and 
proper for the effective administration of this chapter and may, in its discre-
tion, bond any person handling moneys or signing checks hereunder. The 
commission is authorized in its discretion to provide for the maintenance of 
the merit system required under this section in cooperation and conjunction 
with any merit system applicable to any state agency or agencies which meets 
the standards of the commission and those promulgated by the social security 
board. The commission is authorized when permissible under federal and 
state law to make arrangements that will permit individuals employed under 
this chapter to voluntarily elect coverage under the United States CiviJ Ser-
vice Retirement System with respect to past as well as future services. 
Advisory Council. 
• e- The commission shall appoint a state advisory council composed of not 
less than four employer representatives chosen from individuals recom-
mended by employers, an equal number of employee representatives chosen 
from individuals recommended by employee groups, and three public repre-
sentatives who may fairly be regarded as representative because of their 
vocation, employment, or affiliations. The council members shall be appointed 
for two-year terms which commence July 1 and end June 30. The first term 
under this provision shall commence July 1, 1949. however, the commission 
1S6 
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shall terminate the term of am council memoer when he has ceased to be 
representative as designated by his original appointment. The commission 
may appoint local advisory councils composed of an equal number of emplover 
representatives and employee representatives who may fairly be regarded as 
representative because of their vocation, employment, or affiliations and of 
the members representing the general public as the commission may desig-
nate. The state and local advisory councils shall aid the commission in formu-
lating policies and discussing problems related to the administration of this 
chapter and in assuring impartiality and freedom from political influence in 
the solution of those problems. The members of the advisory councils shall 
each be paid for each day of attendance at meetings necessary to the perfor-
mance of their duties, plus necessary expenses, as provided by law. 
Employment Stabilization. 
(f) The commission with the advice and aid of its advisory councils shall 
take all appropriate steps to reduce and prevent unemployment; to encourage 
and assist in the adoption of practical methods of vocational training, retrain-
ing and vocational guidance; to investigate, recommend, advise, and assist in 
the establishment and operation, by the state, of reserves for public works to 
be used in times of business depression and unemployment; to promote the 
creation and development of job opportunities and the reemployment of unem-
ployed workers throughout the state in every way that may be feasible; to 
plan, coordinate, organize, or direct economic development programs as are 
necessary to maintain or create job opportunities; to cooperate with local 
communities, industries and organizations in encouraging and promoting the 
full development of the state's mineral, water, and other natural resources; to 
appraise the agricultural and industrial potential of the state; to these ends to 
carry on activities and organize, coordinate, and publish the results of investi-
gations and research studies. To accomplish these purposes the commission 
may enter into agreements with governmental or other agencies. 
Employment Unit Records — Confidential. 
ig) Each employing unit shall keep true and accurate work records contain-
ing any information the commission may prescribe b> rule. The records shall 
be open to inspection and subject to being copied by the commission or its 
authorized representatives at any reasonable time and as often as may be 
necessary. The commission may require from any employing unit any sworn 
or unsworn reports with respect to persons employed by it which the commis-
sion deems necessary for the effective administration of this chapter. Informa-
tion thus obtained or obtained from any individuals shall not be published or 
be open to public inspection, other than to public employees in the perfor-
mance of their public duties, in any manner revealing the employing unit's or 
individual's identity, but any party to a hearing before an appeals referee or 
the commission shall be supplied with information from these records to the 
extent necessary for the proper presentation of his case, provided, that the 
commission shall upon request in writing from any employer furnish in writ-
ing any information requested concerning claims for benefits with respect to 
his former employees. 
Oaths — Depositions — Witnesses. 
(h) In the discharge of the duties imposed by this chapter, the appeals 
referee or duly authorized representative or member of the commission or the 
board of review as designated by commission rule, has power to administer 
oaths and affirmations, take depositions, certify to official acts, and issue 
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subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of "hooks, 
papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records necessary as e v i n c e 
in "connection with a disputed matter or the administration of this chapter. 
Court to Issue Subpoenas — Compel Attendance. 
(i> In case of contumacy by. or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any 
person anv court of this state within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry j s 
carried on or, within the jurisdiction of which the person guilty of contumacy 
or refusal to obev is found or resides or transacts business, upon application by 
an appeals referee or the board of review or the commission or its duly autho-
rized representative, shall have jurisdiction to issue to that person an order 
requiring the person to appear before a commissioner, an appeals referee, or 
the board of review, or the commission, or its duly authorized representative, 
to produce evidence if so ordered or give testimony regarding the matter 
under investigation or in question; and any failure to obey that order of the 
court may be punished by the court a> contempt. Any person who. without just 
cause, fails or refuses to attend and testify or to answer any lawful inquiry or 
to produce books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records, if it 
is in his power to do so, in obedience to a subpoena of an appeals referee, or the 
board of review, or the commission, shall be punished by a fine of not less than 
S20 nor more than $200 o> by imprisonment for not longer than £0 days or by 
both fine and imprisonment. Each day the violation continues is a separate 
offense. 
Self-incrimination. 
(j) No person may be excused from attending and testifying or from produc-
ing books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other records before the 
commission or its representatives or in obedience to the subpoena of the com-
mission or any of its members or any duly authorized representative of the 
commission in any cause or proceeding before the commission or its represen-
tatives on the ground that the testimony or evidence, documentary or other-
wise, required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty 
or forfeiture. No individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or 
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning 
which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, except that 
the individual testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punish-
ment for perjury committed while testifying. 
Cooperation with Federal Agencies. 
Ik) (D In the administration of this chapter, the commission shall cooperate 
with the United States Department of Labor to the fullest extent consis-
tent with the provisions of this chapter and shall take action, through the 
adoption of appropriate rules and administrative methods and standards, 
as necessary to secure to this state and its citizens all advantages avail-
able under the provisions of the Social Security Ac; that relate to unem-
ployment compensation, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, the 
Wagner-Peyser Act. and the Federal-State Extended Unemployment 
Compensation Act of 1970. 
(2^ In the administration of the provisions in fc 35-4-3.5, which are 
enacted to conform with the requirements of the Federal-State Extended 
Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970. the commission shall take 
that action necessary to ensure that the provisions are so interpreted and 
applied as to meet the requirements of the federal act as interpreted by 
1SS 
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the United States Departmeni of Labor and to secure to this state the full 
reimbursement of the federal share of extended and regular benefits paid 
under this chapter that are reimbursable under the federal act. 
Determination of Employer and Employment. 
ll) The commission or its authorized representatives may upon its own mo-
tion or upon application of an employing unit determine whether an employ-
ing unit constitutes an employer and whether services performed for, or in 
connection with the business of, an employer constitute employment for the 
employing unit. The determinations may constitute the basis for determina-
tion of contribution liability under the provisions of Subsection 35-4-17ib* and 
be subject to review and appeal as provided. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 40. <f 11; C. 1943, 
42-2a-l l; L. 1949, ch. 53, £ 1; 1951, ch. 50, 
fc 1; 1955, ch. 60. £ 1; 1957, ch. «4. * 3; 1971, 
ch. 78, 5 6; 1982, ch. 78, £ 7; 1983, ch. 320, 
$ 15; 1987, ch. 81, $ 7. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1981! amendment 
inserted captions before subsecs. ihi through 
i\\ substituted "lieutenant governor" in the 
third sentence o r subsec. (b> for "secretary of 
state"; substituted "an amount to be deter-
mined by the board of examiners" in the last 
sentence of subsec <e> for "a fee of not more 
than SI5 per day"; and made minor changes in 
phraseology, punctuation and style. 
The 1983 amendment deleted "an amount to 
be determined by the board of examiners" after 
"shall be paid" in the last sentence of subsec. 
(e». added "as provided by law" to the last sen-
tence of subsec. (e); and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation. 
The 19S7 amendment, effective July 1, 1987. 
rewrote Subsection (b»; deleted the former fifth 
sentence of Subsection td), which provided 
"The commission shall not employ or pay any 
person who is an officer or committee member 
of the any political party organization"; in-
serted "United States" preceding "Department 
of Labor" twice in Subsection (k); and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctua-
tion. 
The Federal-State Extended Unemployment 
Compensation Act of 1970. referred in Subsec-
tion (k), appears as 26 U.S.C § 3304. 
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act. re-
ferred to Subsection ik>, appears as 26 U.S.C. 
5 3301 et sec. 
The federal Wagner-Peyser Act. referred in 
Subsection (k), appears as 29 U.S.C. fc 49 et 
sec;. 
Department of Employment Security 
Bui ld ing . 
Laws 197S. ch. 255. provides: "Section 1. 
There is hereby appropriated out of funds made 
available to this state under Section 903 of the 
Social Security Act, as amended, the sum of 
$208,343 or so much thereof as may be neces-
sary, to be expended by and under the direction 
of the department of employment hecunty with 
the approval of the state building board for the 
purpose of acquiring land and erecting build-
ings thereon for the use of the department of 
employment security, and for such improve-
ments, facilities, paving, landscaping, and 
fixed equipment as may be required for their 
proper use and operation b\ the department of 
employment security. 
"Section 2. No part of the monies hereby ap-
propriated may be obligated after the expira-
tion of the two-year period beginning on the 
effective date of this act. 
"Section o. The amount obligated pursuant 
to this act during any 12-month period begin-
ning on July 1 and ending on the next June 30 
shall not exceed the amount by which ia» the 
aggregate of the amounts credited to the ac-
count of this state pursuant to Section 903 of 
the Social Security Act during such 12-month 
period and the 24 preceding 12-month periods 
exceeds (b> the aggregate of the amounts obli-
gated for administration and paid out for bene-
fits iind charged against the amounts credited 
to the account of this state during such 25 12-
month periods. 
"Section 4. This act shall take effect upon 
approval." Approved March 13, 1979. 
Right of commiss ion to a p p o i n t attorneys. 
The attorney general does not have exclusive 
constitutional authority to act as legal adviser 
to the industrial commission in the adminis-
tration of the Unemployment Compensation 
Act: therefore, the provision of this section au-
thorizing the commission to appoint attorneys 
does no: violate Art. VII. fc 16 of the state con-
stitution: furthermore, this section provides an 
exception to the general authority of the attor-
ney general to perform legal services for any 
agency of state government. Hansen v. Utah 
State Retirement Bd. (Utah 1982; 652 P 2d 
1332. 
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